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CLEANING-UP AFTER CARPENTER: PERSONAL DATA AS
PROPERTY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Alessandra Masciandaro*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Changes in law [are] full of danger.”1 The Supreme Court’s
adherence to the principle of stare decisis speaks to this truth. Rather
than leap to upend well-settled doctrine, when novel situations arise,
the Court turns to legal fictions to achieve justice while applying existing
law2—”[f]or the written word remains, but man changes.”3 Tensions
rise when popular ideas of justice conflict with the written law.4 To
harmonize the two, legal fictions erupt that “mark where there was once
a distinction between law in the books and law in action, and show one
way in which the two have been brought into accord.”5 But the use of
legal fictions is not without consequences.6
Today the United States is caught in the throes of a legal fiction
developed to extend Fourth Amendment protection to objects of an
individual’s privacy—the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.7
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1 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 12 (1910).
2 See id. at 12–13. Pound employs a metaphor, describing the practice of using legal
fictions as the way “the law has always managed to get a pickaxe in its hands, though it
steadfastly demanded a case-knife, and to wield it in the virtuous belief that it was using
the approved instrument.” Id.
3 Id. at 36.
4 Id. at 13–15 (presenting examples of legal fictions from archaic legal systems
through the twentieth century).
5 Id. at 14.
6 See infra Part V.
7 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a
conversation that the defendant had while within a phonebooth was protected under
the Fourth Amendment because he had a “reasonable expectation of privacy”—a new
standard for Fourth Amendment protection).
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Examining the history of the Fourth Amendment8 and the line of
jurisprudence that follows from Katz9 reveals a sharp divide between
the original intent of the Fourth Amendment and its actual application
today. While courts have perpetuated the use of the Katz test, it stands
on shaky ground.10
In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. United States by
applying Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test.11 The Court
found that law enforcement officers had violated Carpenter’s right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure when those officers accessed
Carpenter’s historic cell-site location information without a warrant
because Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole
of his movements.12 Despite the Court’s presumably good intentions,
this holding has left lower courts struggling to properly apply the Fourth
Amendment to other forms of personal data.13
In its essence, the difficulty that Carpenter created appears to stem
from applying two legal fictions to protect location data: (1) the Katz
test; and (2) the premise that privacy rights—not property
rights—apply to personal data. The law as written and the sensibilities
of the people diverge—the law on the books says that the Fourth
Amendment only protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” but the
law in action says that it also protects reasonable expectations of
privacy; the law on the books says only privacy rights extend to personal
data, but the law in action says personal data is property.14

8

Infra Section III.A.
Infra Section III.B.
10 Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the
Evolving Fourth Amendment, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 110 (2017–2018).
11 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (5-4 decision).
12 Id. at 2219.
13 See Allison Grande, Location Privacy Warrant Lines Still Murky After Carpenter,
LAW360 (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1189523 (“[T]he [C]ourt
left open whether the requirement applies to other categories of sensitive digital data,
such as real-time cellphone records, internet browsing histories, toll transactions and
smart meter usage.”).
14 American legislatures have not explicitly granted property-status to personal
data; however, state legislatures are increasingly treating personal data as property
under data privacy laws. See, e.g., Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008,
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008) (allowing for a cause of action even where no actual injury
occurred—a violation of statutory protection of biometric information alone suffices to
establish standing); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020) (granting individuals the right to have their
personal information deleted).
9
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Legal fictions “soon get into the books and become part of the law
as it is written.”15 This Comment analyzes the implications of classifying
personal data as property under the Fourth Amendment. Doing so could
relieve the judicial system of the confusion caused by applying two legal
fictions to personal data under the Fourth Amendment. Law
enforcement could benefit from a categorical rule as to when a warrant
is required. Recognizing personal data as property under the Fourth
Amendment could also benefit individuals by ensuring that the Fourth
Amendment will protect their personal data from unreasonable search
and seizure.
The expansion of state data privacy laws provides a basis that could
allow the Supreme Court to find that state legislatures have implicitly
recognized a property right in personal data; as such, when an
appropriate case or controversy arises, the Court could hold that
personal data is property that the Fourth Amendment protects.
Employing legal fictions—the reasonable expectation of privacy test16
and classifying personal data as an object of privacy rights
alone—would no longer be necessary to apply the Fourth Amendment
to personal data. In theory, this could allow for predictable warrant
requirements and a consistent administration of justice. But personal
data is complex. Issues arise as to its proper definition and to whom
data should belong.17
This Comment examines the possibility that personal data could be
brought under the Fourth Amendment as a form of property. Part II of
this Comment analyzes the Court’s decision in Carpenter and discusses
the difficulties that this decision has created. Part III explores the text
and history surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. It then
provides an overview of Katz and its progeny leading up to the Court’s
decision in Carpenter. In Part IV, this Comment explores how current
and pending state data privacy legislation treat personal data as
property. This Part also explores various definitions of personal data
and their implications for this analysis. Part V considers whether
recognizing personal data as property under the Fourth Amendment
would heighten courts’ efficiency in applying the Fourth Amendment to
15

Pound, supra note 1, at 14.
See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (setting forth the
reasonable expectation of privacy test).
17 See Andy Green, Complete Guide to Privacy Laws in the US, VARONIS (Mar. 29, 2020),
https://www.varonis.com/blog/us-privacy-laws (comparing various definitions of
personal information under proposed state data privacy laws); see also Stacy-Ann Elvy,
Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 463
(2018) (describing the question of data ownership or rights as a “vexing” question in the
context of Internet of Things devices).
16
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personal data. This Part also explores the difficulty in defining “personal
data” as property, given longstanding notions of the appropriate objects
of property rights. In Part VI, this Comment discusses consequences
that may follow if state legislatures widely adopted the notion that
personal data is property. This Comment suggests that the states should
continue to cautiously exercise their roles as laboratories, imparting
piecemeal property rights to personal data and evaluating their impact.
Part VII concludes that while a Supreme Court opinion holding that
personal data is property under the Fourth Amendment could eliminate
the need to resort to legal fictions in this context, the difficulties in
defining which items of “personal data” qualify as property may leave
courts no better off than using the Katz test.
II. CARPENTER’S CONTROVERSIAL PROTECTION OF HISTORIC CELL-SITE
LOCATION INFORMATION
In United States v. Carpenter, the Supreme Court divided on
whether historic cell-site location information falls under the Fourth
Amendment.18 The majority ruled that it does because individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements.19 Four dissenters each authored separate opinions.
Despite this divide among the dissenters, each invoked the concept of
applying the Fourth Amendment to property interests. If the Court
recognized personal data as an effect belonging to the person to whom
it pertains, the Court might have unanimously agreed that historic cellsite location information is subject to the Fourth Amendment. An
analysis of each opinion follows.
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that acquiring a
historic record of an individual’s movements over an extended period
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.20
This result was
foreshadowed by dicta in United States v. Jones.21 At first, the Carpenter
decision appeared to bring important Fourth Amendment protection to
individuals in the modern-day era, but this impression quickly faded as

18
19
20
21

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
Id. at 2219.
Id.
565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012).
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courts demonstrated a reluctance to require a warrant for access to
similar records.22
The Court applied Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test to
cell-site location information (CSLI), which revealed “the whole of
[Carpenter’s] physical movements.”23 Additionally, the Court examined
the nature of CSLI acquisition under a multifactor analysis that it had
previously used to evaluate “such surveillance techniques as bugging,
wiretaps, video surveillance, and email acquisitions” under the Fourth
Amendment.24 When law enforcement officers acquired Carpenter’s
CSLI, they accessed the whole of his physical movements in a hidden,
continuous, indiscriminate, and intrusive manner.25 The Court found
this method to be problematic because accessing CSLI provides a “near
perfect” surveillance.26 By grasping onto Katz’s reasonable expectation
of privacy test and supplementing its analysis by considering
problematic surveillance methods, the Court managed to bring historic
CSLI under the Fourth Amendment.
This feat of judicial gymnastics ultimately achieved an outcome
that many would regard as just, but it failed to provide an intelligible
precedent for lower courts to follow.27 Essentially, the Court treated
personal data as property by bringing it within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment—a provision of our Constitution designed to protect
persons, their houses, and their intimate personal property.28 Simply
recognizing personal data as a form of property could have achieved the
same result in an efficient and doctrinally sound manner if the Court
were to take an agreeable approach to personal data.

22 See, e.g., Rick Aldrich, Privacy’s “Third-Party” Doctrine: Initial Developments in the
Wake of Carpenter, 15 SCITECH LAW. 4, 6–7 (2019) (stating that most decisions that cite
Carpenter’s holding do not suppress CSLI evidence); see also Grande, supra note 13.
23 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2219.
24 Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near Perfect
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 219 (2018).
25 See id. at 221.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 22, at 6–7 (stating that most decisions that cite
Carpenter’s holding do not suppress CSLI evidence); see also Grande, supra note 13.
28 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“For the majority, this case
is apparently no different from one in which Government agents raided Carpenter’s
home and removed records associated with his cell phone.”). The third-party doctrine
provides that individuals do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in anything
disclosed to a third party.
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In Smith v. Maryland29 and United States v. Miller,30 the government
attempted to justify its warrantless access of Carpenter’s CSLI by
turning to the third-party doctrine.31 This argument failed.32 The Court
found that the third-party doctrine was ill-suited to handle “the
exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by
wireless carriers today.”33 While Smith and Miller address “limited
types of personal information,” CSLI provides a comprehensive
chronicle of personal information that implicates significantly greater
privacy concerns.34 Further, the Court found that CSLI is not
transmitted voluntarily.35 Rather, wireless providers automatically
collect CSLI whenever a cell phone is connected to their network.36
Carpenter limited the third-party doctrine, finding that it does not
apply to CSLI because of the detailed, chronological nature of CSLI and
the involuntary manner in which it is collected.37 Scholars suggest that
this holding indicates that a warrant should be required when an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy in the records converts
the records into the modern-day equivalent of an individual’s own
papers or effects . . . whether [or not] those records are stored with . . . a
third party.”38 While this suggestion achieves the desired result of
avoiding the third-party doctrine, it suggests a complicated procedure
to do so. Rather than first debating whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their records, personal data could be
categorically recognized as an “effect.” This would impose a warrant
requirement on personal data, eliminating normative judgments about
which expectations of privacy are reasonable.

29

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
31 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 2219–20.
35 Id. at 2220 (“Cell phone location information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally
understands the term.”).
36 Id.
37 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20; see also Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 218
(“[T]he majority found that cell site records, due to their unique and revealing nature,
were not subject to the third party doctrine of Smith and Miller.”).
38 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 226.
30
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B. The Dissenting Opinions
Carpenter presented a contentious issue, which resulted in a 5-4
split among the Justices.39 Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch
dissented.40 Though each Justice made a distinct argument to reject the
majority’s decision, one common theme ran through each dissenting
opinion—an emphasis on property concepts.41
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
rested on the premise that the third-party doctrine should apply to
CSLI.42 From Justice Kennedy’s perspective, the issue should have been
addressed “by interpreting accepted property principles as the baseline
for reasonable expectations of privacy.”43 Since Carpenter’s wireless
provider created and retained the CSLI records, Justice Kennedy
believed that the records should be regarded as the wireless provider’s
property; therefore, the third-party doctrine should insulate them from
the Fourth Amendment.44 Accordingly, acquiring CSLI records should
then merely require a subpoena duces tecum.45
Justice Thomas carefully parsed the text of the Fourth Amendment
in his dissenting opinion.46 First, Justice Thomas drew attention to the
word “their” from the phrase protecting individuals “from unreasonable
searches of ‘their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”47 Carpenter
must prove the CSLI is his in order to come under the Fourth
Amendment.48 This analysis stresses that “their” indicates that the key
issue is “whose property was searched.”49 In addition to this assertion,
Justice Thomas heavily criticizes Katz’s reasonable expectation of
privacy test as inconsistent with a proper understanding of the Fourth
Amendment.50 Justice Thomas found that Carpenter’s claim failed under
an approach focused strictly on property concepts.51 In his analysis, the
Fourth Amendment’s close connection to property presents itself
39

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (5-4 decision).
Id.
41 See, e.g., id. at 2224, 2235, 2260 & 2268.
42 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24 at 218.
43 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235.
44 Id. at 2229–30.
45 See id. at 2235.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2242.
49 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235.
50 Id. at 2236 (“The more fundamental problem with the Court’s opinion . . . is its use
of the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test . . . .”); Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24,
at 218.
51 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 218.
40
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through the text that limits protection to persons and “three specific
types of property: ‘houses, papers, and effects.’”52 Since data is not
recognized as one of these forms of property, Justice Thomas concluded
the Fourth Amendment does not cover it.53
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented on the basis that
the government may use a subpoena to acquire CSLI, subject to
relevance review.54 From Justice Alito’s perspective, the majority erred
by expanding the protection against an unreasonable search of one’s
property to protect against an unreasonable search of a third party’s
property.55 Justice Alito saw the majority’s decision as fracturing two
“fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law.”56 First, conflating the
distinction between a physical search and an order to produce
documents.57 And second, “allow[ing] a defendant to object to the
search of a third party’s property.”58 Justice Alito concluded his dissent
by criticizing the majority’s “desire to make a statement about privacy
in the digital age.”59 Whatever pragmatic value such a statement may
have, the Honorable Justice Alito found it could “not justify the
consequences that [the Carpenter] decision is likely to produce.”60
Finally, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent presents not only a propertybased approach to the Fourth Amendment but also suggests how
CSLI—and, by extension, other personal data—can be treated as
property under the Fourth Amendment.61 Justice Gorsuch’s analysis of
how personal data can be treated as property begins by noting that
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test “only ‘supplements, rather
than displaces the traditional property-based understanding of the
Fourth Amendment.’”62 Having established the continued functionality
of property concepts under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Gorsuch
elaborates on the benefits that flow from taking a property-based
approach.63
52

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239.
Id.
54 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 218.
55 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2261.
60 Id.
61 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261–62 (introducing his analysis that sets aside Smith
and Miller as ill-suited for the digital age, finding a retreat to Katz unnecessary, and then
formulating how personal data can be treated as property under the Fourth
Amendment).
62 Id. at 2268 (quoting Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018)).
63 Id. at 2268–71.
53
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According to Justice Gorsuch, a property-based approach fits more
readily within judicial powers than the Katz test because it does not ask
judges to make normative judgment calls about what should be
private.64 Instead, judges are encouraged to consult the legislative
branch and the common law to determine the people’s rights.65 Under
a property-based approach, sharing data with a third party does not
automatically eliminate an individual’s rights in that data.66 Rather,
allowing a third party to hold data to process for some particular
purpose is a bailment.67 The Fourth Amendment does not require
complete ownership and exclusive control for protection under a
property-based approach.68 Justice Gorsuch notes that the Fourth
Amendment protects a person from an unreasonable search of her home
whether or not she owns it in fee simple.69 Moreover, an approach based
on property law “may help provide detailed guidance on evolving
technologies without resort to judicial intuition.”70
In this final dissent, Justice Gorsuch openly expresses sympathy for
a Fourth Amendment protection argument based on property rights
under the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999.71
Carpenter’s failure to develop this argument in the courts below led
Justice Gorsuch to dismiss its viability in the case before him.72 Perhaps
intending to plant a seed for a future decision to grasp onto in
recognizing property rights in personal data, Justice Gorsuch wrote:
“Plainly, customers have substantial legal interests in [CSLI] including
at least some right to include, exclude, and control its use. Those
interests might even rise to the level of a property right.”73 Seizing upon
this statement and the implicit treatment of personal data as property
under emerging state privacy laws, a future defendant may fare well
making an argument for Fourth Amendment protection on the basis that
personal data is an effect.

64

Id. at 2268.
Id.
66 Id.
67 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (“A bailment is the ‘delivery of personal property by
one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a certain
purpose.’”).
68 See id. at 2269.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2270 (“If state legislators or state courts say that a digital record has the
attributes that normally make something property, that may supply a sounder basis for
judicial decision making than judicial guesswork about societal expectations.”).
71 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 219.
72 Id.
73 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (emphasis added).
65
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III. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Carpenter Court relied upon the reasonable expectation of
privacy test to protect historic cell-site location data.74 But how does a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” relate to the Fourth Amendment?
And what exactly is a “reasonable expectation of privacy?” Examining
the origin of the Fourth Amendment, the Katz decision that set this test
in motion, and cases on the path from Katz to Carpenter sheds light on
these questions.
A. The Origin of the Fourth Amendment
When the United States adopted the Fourth Amendment, American
political leaders regarded Entick v. Carrington75 as “‘the true and
ultimate expression of constitutional law’ with regard to search and
seizure.”76 Entick places striking importance on respecting property
rights, stating that under English law, “the property of every man [is] so
sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without
his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at
all.”77 This reverence for property presents itself in the Fourth
Amendment’s text. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.78
This, however, was not the text of the original draft.79
The Fourth Amendment’s first draft used the phrase “other
property” where “effects” currently stands.80 Some debate exists as to
whether this change had the impact of narrowing or expanding the
scope of the Fourth Amendment,81 but recent scholars typically agree
that the impact was to narrow its scope.82 The consensus is that the
phrase “other property” indicates protection for real property, where
74

Id. at 2219.
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
76 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)).
77 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817.
78 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
79 Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal
Property its Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 984 (2016).
80 Id. at 984–85.
81 United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2241 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82 Brady, supra note 79, at 985.
75
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“effects” excludes real property and instead extends to personal
property.83
“Effects meant, and means, ‘personal property.’”84
Recognizing personal data as personal property places it squarely
within the category of “effects,” facilitating an efficient route to the
Fourth Amendment’s protections from unreasonable searches and
seizures for personal data.
But the question remains: can personal data be considered a form
of personal property? The answer appears to be “yes,” where personal
data is rightly defined; therefore, it may qualify as an “effect.” Much of
the difficulty in applying the Fourth Amendment to personal data stems
from the notion that data is intangible, so it cannot be considered
property. In Katz, the focus on finding a tangible substance to protect
presents itself in Justice Black’s dissent.85 While Justice Black may be
correct that a conversation overheard is not tangible, his analysis failed
to make the significant distinction between a conversation that is
merely overheard and one that is recorded, as was the case in Katz.86
Many members of the scientific community accept the proposition
that data is tangible.87 Taking this as a fact would allow personal data
to comfortably align with the Fourth Amendment’s original intent to
protect effects. Digitized personal information would be tangible
because, under this view, “[an] asset is tangible when recorded.”88
Though the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test remains a valuable
tool for affording Fourth Amendment protection where a strict
property-based rationale does not apply, the Court may be able to move
away from its reliance on legal fictions in this context by holding that
personal data is an “effect.”

83 Id. Brady explains that “[e]ach of the ordinary dictionaries cited by the modern
Court as authority for the original meaning of the Constitution defines ‘effects’ to mean
chattels or possessions.” Id.
84 Id. at 1001.
85 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (“A conversation overheard by . . .
wiretapping, is not tangible . . . .”).
86 Id. at 349.
87 See Ritter & Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for Moving
Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 223 (2018) (“[T]he scientific consensus [is] that
digital information is not intangible, but is physical, tangible matter.”); see also id. at 256
(“[T]he physical quality of information, and the idea that information is a physical
constituent of the universe, are widely adopted within the scientific community.”).
88 Id. at 257.
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B. Analyzing Katz and Its Progeny
To understand the decision in Carpenter, familiarity with the origin
of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and its application in
cases that are relevant to Carpenter’s holding is useful. Since its
inception, the reasonable expectation of privacy test has been met with
criticism.89 The foundation of these objections is the Court’s departure
from applying the Amendment to protect against unreasonable searches
and seizures of property to broadly protecting privacy.90 On a
fundamental level, critics contend that the Court exceeded its power in
creating the Katz test.91 Nonetheless, the Court has continued to apply
the reasonable expectation of privacy test to achieve just outcomes
when faced with cases that could not have otherwise been brought
under the Fourth Amendment.92
In Katz, the petitioner objected to the government’s use of a
recorded conversation at trial.93 FBI agents had made the recording by
placing a recording device outside of a telephone booth that Katz used
to make a telephone call.94 Katz erroneously argued that the telephone
booth was a constitutionally protected area in an attempt to qualify for
Fourth Amendment protection.95 The Court rejected this argument,
noting that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”96
Despite the government’s arguments to the contrary, the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures regardless of an individual’s location.97 According to the Court,
a reading of the Fourth Amendment that excluded protection for
89 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting) (“My basic objection is twofold: (1)
I do not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by
today’s decision, and (2) I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite
the Amendment in order ‘to bring it into harmony with the times’ and thus reach a result
that many people believe to be desirable.”).
90 See id. at 373.
91 Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (“I will not distort the words of the Amendment . . . . It
was never meant that this Court have such power, which in effect would make us a
continuously functioning constitutional convention.”).
92 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (recognizing a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of one’s physical movements revealed by
historic CSLI); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (warrant required to search
cell phones given reasonable expectations of privacy in the large quantities of personal
information stored on cell phones); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012)
(stating in dicta that secretive long-term monitoring of a person’s vehicle would violate
reasonable expectation of privacy).
93 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 349–50.
96 Id. at 351.
97 Id. at 359.
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conversations in telephone booths would improperly disregard the
importance of the public telephone in conducting private
conversations.98
The reasonable expectation of privacy test emerged in Justice
Harlan’s concurrence.99 In its original formulation, the test had two
requirements: (1) an individual actually possesses a subjective
expectation of privacy in the matter at issue; and (2) that expectation is
one that society would recognize as reasonable.100 Over time, the Court
has simplified the test by minimizing the first prong and looking merely
at whether society would find an expectation of privacy reasonable
under the circumstances of a given case.101 In application, this is a
normative test that requires judges to decide what should be private.102
Critics vehemently oppose this result because it is impermissible for
judges to substitute their judgment as to what should be protected for
that of the legislature.103
The Katz decision might have come out differently if a propertybased rationale had been applied. This case involved the FBI creating a
digital record of an individual’s conversation without his knowledge or
consent.104 This recorded conversation could be considered personal
data under a broad understanding of what constitutes “personal
data,”105 but personal data definitions vary.106 The potential outcomes
under a property rationale differ starkly when taking account of these
different definitions.

98

Id. at 352.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
100 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
101 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238.
102 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 221–22.
103 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[The reasonable
expectation of privacy test] invites courts to make judgments about policy, not law.”); id.
at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Deciding what privacy interests should be recognized
. . . calls for the exercise of raw political will belonging to the legislatures, not the legal
judgment proper to courts.”); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 374 (Black, J., dissenting)
(“Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were with the excesses of
governmental power, did not intend to grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking
authority as [to create a general right to privacy]. The history of governments proves
that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.”).
104 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
105 See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020) (defining “personal
information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a
particular consumer or household”).
106 See Green, supra note 17.
99
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First, there is the question of whether the recorded conversation
qualifies as “personal information” at all, and then, if so, to whom it
belongs. If the conversation is not viewed as personal information, then
the recording would likely be viewed as the government’s property, and
Katz would fail to invoke Fourth Amendment protection. If it is viewed
as personal information, it might belong to Katz, the person he spoke
with, both of them, or—yet again—the government because the
government created the recording. Katz would only be successful under
a property-based approach if the recorded conversation were viewed as
personal information belonging to Katz. Under this approach, Katz’s
recorded conversation would be his effect; accordingly, the government
would need a warrant to search or seize it. Taking a property-based
approach in lieu of the Katz test could similarly disrupt the Supreme
Court’s decisions in cases that followed Katz.
The first case following Katz that is relevant to Carpenter is United
States v. Miller.107 Miller is largely responsible for the “third-party
doctrine,” which postulates that a person has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in data voluntarily conveyed to a third party.108 To comply
with the Bank Secrecy Act,109 Miller’s bank retained his financial
transaction records.110 The government suspected that Miller was
illegally operating a distillery and failing to pay proper taxes.111 The
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau accessed Miller’s financial
records at two banks where he was a customer with subpoenas rather
than warrants.112 The Court found that Miller’s bank records were not
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because a person can
maintain no reasonable expectation of privacy in records voluntarily
conveyed to a third party.113
Like the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the third-party
doctrine has received harsh criticism since its origin.114 One source of
this criticism comes from the fallacy of assuming that records are
107

425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
109 12 U.S.C. § 1829(d) (2012).
110 Miller, 425 U.S. at 436.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 437.
113 Id. at 442–43.
114 See id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.
3d 238 (1974)) (“To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon his
request, without any judicial control . . . opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of
very real abuses of police power.”); see also id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(proposing that retaining records pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act is itself an
unconstitutional seizure; therefore, law enforcement cannot constitutionally access
these records).
108
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voluntarily conveyed.115 Reliance on property rights may have avoided
these difficulties because the information conveyed to a third party for
a limited purpose could be considered a bailment—a transfer of
possession for a certain limited purpose without surrendering
ownership rights.116
Under a property-based theory, Miller may or may not have come
out differently. The Court could have found that the seizure of Miller’s
financial records violated the Fourth Amendment because Miller held
property rights in those records although the bank possessed them for
certain limited purposes. Alternatively, the Court may have found that
the government’s access to Miller’s financial records was lawful because
the search or seizure was reasonable. Keep in mind that the Fourth
Amendment only prohibits those searches and seizures of persons,
houses, papers, or effects that rise to the level of unreasonable.117 It is
feasible that the Court would have concluded that Congress, in enacting
the Bank Secrecy Act, properly recognized that a search or seizure is
reasonable under these circumstances. On the other hand, employing a
property-based rationale could have led to Miller’s records being the
bank’s property. Miller would not be able to assert a Fourth
Amendment right to his bank records if they were deemed the bank’s
property.
Smith v. Maryland118 is the next case relevant to Carpenter. This
case is analogous to Miller, as it also involves warrantless access to
information conveyed to a third party.119 In Smith, the Court held that
Smith had voluntarily assumed the risk that the phone company would
convey the phone numbers he dialed to law enforcement.120 Because
Smith had assumed that risk, the Court found that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the records of phone numbers that he had
dialed.121
115 Id. at 451(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d
238 (1974)) (“For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms
of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank
account.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746–47 (1979) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 387 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that records of
phone numbers that an individual dials are not truly voluntarily conveyed given the
“vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication[s]”).
116 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
117 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
118 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).
119 See id. at 745–46.
120 Id. at 744.
121 Id. at 745.

MASCIANDARO (DO NOT DELETE)

1256

4/8/2021 3:59 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1241

Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that people do have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers that they dial.122
Justice Marshall also dissented, powerfully articulating the dangers of
unregulated government monitoring: “Permitting governmental access
to telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede
certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are
the hallmark of a truly free society.”123 To the majority, however, the
third-party doctrine dictated the result—the government would not be
required to obtain a warrant before accessing an individual’s records at
the telephone company.124
Smith attempted to argue that the Court should find his expectation
of privacy reasonable because he had made calls without a live
operator.125 These calls were processed through switching equipment
that could only “remember” numbers if programmed to do so.126 The
Court rejected this argument, noting the “crazy quilt” of a rule that
would result if petitioner’s suggestion were adopted.127 The Court’s
desire to avoid “mak[ing] a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment”128 is
admirable, but continuing to apply the reasonable expectation of
privacy test with the third-party doctrine at times appears to do just
that.
Congress responded to the issues in Smith with legislation. The Pen
Register Statute,129 requires the government to obtain a court order
prior to installing a pen register.130 While this allows the use of pen
registers without requiring a warrant, the government must
demonstrate that “the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”131 This Congressional enactment
reflects the fact pen register data falls outside of the current
understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s scope.

122

Id. at 747.
Id. at 751.
124 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
125 Id. at 745.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 745 (“We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment,
especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be dictated
by billing practices of a private corporation.”).
128 Id.
129 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012).
130 BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE CRIMINAL LAW § 4:20 RIGHT OF PRIVACY—PEN REGISTERS
(2019).
131 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
123
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Next, the case of United States v. Jones132 warrants discussion. Jones
is more analogous to the facts at issue in Carpenter, as it is the first case
where the Court begins to address law enforcement’s use of modern
surveillance technology.133 In Jones, the government installed a global
positioning system (GPS) device on Jones’s wife’s car after its warrant
to do so expired.134 In addition, the warrant only authorized
government action in the District of Columbia, but the government
attached the GPS device when the car was in Maryland.135 Ultimately,
the Court decided this case based on physical trespass into the vehicle,
but “five justices agreed that a surreptitious long-term monitoring of the
vehicle also impinged on reasonable expectations of privacy, even if
those movements were in public view.”136 Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority: “[i]t is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term
is used in the [Fourth] Amendment.”137
The Jones Court’s reliance on the right to be free from physical
trespass (despite recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in
dicta) reveals a preference for a property-based rationale over Katz’s
legal fiction. If the two stood on equal ground, the Court could have held
the Fourth Amendment was violated on both grounds, but it did not.
The Jones Court avoided the problematic reasonable expectation of
privacy test entirely in its holding and merely paid homage to Katz’s
precedent in dicta.138
Justice Sotomayor wrote a powerful concurrence that cautions
against permitting an overly permeating police surveillance.139
“Awareness that the government may be watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms. . . . GPS monitoring . . . may ‘alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.’”140 Justice Sotomayor went on to question whether
the third-party doctrine should be reconsidered, as it is “ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
132

565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 216.
134 Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03.
135 Id. at 403.
136 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 216–17.
137 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
138 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 222 n.152 (“The Jones Court recognized that
nontrespassory acquisitions of location data would involve a Katz analysis, but it put off
conducting that analysis and the ‘thorny problems’ associated with it for another day.”).
139 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640
F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
133
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tasks.”141
Indeed, recognizing that personal data is personal
property—as an effect subject to Fourth Amendment protection—could
alleviate these concerns. There would be no need to invoke the thirdparty doctrine and the Katz test under a property-based rationale taking
this approach to personal data.
A final case worth considering on the path from Katz to Carpenter
is Riley v. California.142 Riley objected to law enforcement’s search of the
data on his cell phone after he was arrested.143 Generally, the law
recognizes a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment for a search
incident to an arrest.144 The Court’s holding narrowed this exception to
exclude searching the data stored on cell phones.145 Cell phones have a
unique tendency to store vast amounts of personal information. This
served as the foundation for the Court’s decision to exempt cell phone
data from the traditional Fourth Amendment exception for searches
incident to an arrest.146 The Court recognized the widespread use of cell
phones in American society and the pervasive nature of the personal
information that these devices typically store.147
California attempted to argue for a limited warrant requirement
for cell phone searches on a variety of grounds.148 Ultimately, the Court
decided to impose a general categorical restriction on searches of cell
phone data incident to arrest.149 The Court emphasized the need to
provide clear guidance to law enforcement in order to avoid “a difficult
line-drawing expedition.”150

141

Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
143 See id. at 378–79.
144 Aldrich, supra note 22, at 5.
145 Id.
146 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 217; Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (“Cell phones . . .
place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals. . . .
[O]fficers must generally secure a warrant before conducting [a search of data on a cell
phone].”).
147 Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 (“[M]any of the more than 90% of American adults who own
a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their
lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”).
148 Id. at 398–400 (allowing searches of arrestee’s cell phones if officers limited to
“areas of the phone where an officer reasonably believes that information relevant to
the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer safety will be discovered,” the call log, and “if
[officers] could have obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.”).
149 Id. at 398 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981)) (“[I]f
police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in
large part be done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by
individual police officers.’”).
150 Id. at 401.
142
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Recognizing that personal data is personal property would be
consistent with the Court’s desire to provide a clear categorical rule.
The failure to do so has left lower courts reluctant to require a warrant
under the Fourth Amendment in cases involving search and seizure of
personal data after Carpenter.151 In an effort to be prudent, courts are
interpreting Carpenter narrowly.152 While not requiring a warrant to
search and seize personal data may avoid an impediment in law
enforcement’s ease of access to such data, it is likely causing more harm
than good by subjecting citizens to unreasonable search and seizure of
their personal data. Accepting personal data as an effect could provide
clear notice to law enforcement that a warrant is required to search or
seize these sensitive digital records—helping to secure individuals’
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in the digital era.
IV. PERSONAL DATA IS TREATED AS PROPERTY UNDER STATE DATA PRIVACY
LAWS
“[T]he divergence between the law in books and law in action is
more acute in some periods of legal history than in others.”153 Scholars
argue that “data has now become a new kind of property—an asset that
is created, manufactured, processed, stored, transferred, licensed, sold,
and stolen.”154 In today’s rapidly advancing technological era, courts
and legislatures grapple with protecting personal data.155 Under the
guise of increasingly expansive privacy laws, state legislatures are
imparting property rights in personal data.
It is not within the province of the Court to decide what property
rights should be. State legislatures and the common law are typically
responsible for both creating and safeguarding individuals’ property
rights.156 But what has yet gone unnoticed is the fact that the states are
151

See Grande, supra note 13 (“[d]istrict courts have been reluctant to require
warrants for access to digital records beyond the historical cellphone location data
covered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s [Carpenter] decision.”); see also Aldrich, supra note
22, at 7 (discussing United States v. Oakes, No. 3:16-cr-00196 (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 2018),
where the court denied Fourth Amendment protection to access of a defendant’s
location through search and seizure of CSLI under the premise that Carpenter only
applied to CSLI related to one’s phone).
152 See Grande, supra note 13; see also Aldrich, supra note 22, at 6–7.
153 Pound, supra note 1, at 22.
154 Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 221.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (historic cell-site
location information); see also Riley, 573 U.S. 373 (data stored on a smartphone); Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020).
156 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (stating that protection
of persons’ property is mainly the responsibility of state legislatures); see also Pamela
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beginning to grant property rights in personal data while continuing to
apply the label of “privacy.” State legislatures employ a legal fiction by
speaking of personal data as if it were only protected by privacy
rights—but their actions continually extend property rights to personal
data. The Court could take notice of this reality and recognize that
personal data is a form of property protected under the Fourth
Amendment. Waiting for the legislatures to make the leap to reclassify
personal data as property may be a mistake, as the risks that come with
changes in law stymie change even in the face of pressing reasons to
alter the law.157
A. Privacy vs. Property: What’s the Difference?
While privacy says “you cannot see” or “you cannot know,”
property says “you cannot possess, use, or modify.”158 Louis D. Brandeis
and Samuel D. Warren’s The Right to Privacy159 is the seminal work on
privacy scholarship.160 In their article, Brandeis and Warren describe a
privacy right as “the right to one’s personality.”161 Privacy allows
individuals to maintain their unique, authentic selves by providing a
shield from unwanted criticism. The scholars explain that the right to
privacy applies to “personal writings and any other productions of the
intellect or of the emotions.”162 They argue that “privacy for thoughts,
emotions, and sensations . . . should receive the same protection,
whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in
attitudes, or in a facial expression.”163 According to these scholars’

Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1142 (2000) (“Grants
of property rights are generally the province of state law.”). See generally Carol M. Rose,
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 77 (1985) (discussing various
theories of property that emerged from the common law).
157 See Pound, supra note 1, at 14; see also Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 223
(arguing that deference to the legislature is a flawed approach because Congress
“recognized the cell phone tracking problem but was content to legislate on the margins,
deferring to courts on the hard question of legal standards”).
158 Compare Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal
Information Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy—Is There a Match?, 22 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 307, 311–14 (2008) (noting the prevailing philosophical justifications for
privacy being to “avoid unwilling exposure of personal information” and protect “the
desire for freedom from observation”), with Brady, supra note 79, at 994 (“Personal
property gives its owner a right to exclude others from possessing, using, and interfering
with the effect.”).
159 Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
160 See Newman, supra note 158, at 310.
161 Brandeis & Warren, supra note 159, at 207.
162 Id. at 213.
163 Id. at 206.
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thesis, objects of privacy are incorporeal, though they may be embodied
in various media. In general, a privacy right functions to exclude others
from nonconsensual access to the object of the privacy interest.164
There are a number of philosophical justifications for privacy.165
Three of the major philosophical justifications for privacy apply
specifically to personal information privacy.166 The first deals with
“socialization and freedom from unwilling exposure.”167 Under this
theory, privacy functions to preserve the personality.168 By placing
limits on others’ access to oneself, an individual can avoid social
pressure to change.169 Additionally, privacy plays an important role in
socialization by facilitating intimate relationships.170 Privacy allows an
individual to create a realm of secret information known only to those
specially selected to share in intimacy.
The second relevant philosophical justification for privacy in one’s
personal information is “interiority and freedom from observation.”171
This theory provides that privacy benefits individuals by allowing for
secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.172 “Interiority” allows an individual to
exercise critical thought free from social pressure, and it is the prerequisite for self-reflection.173 This gives individuals the ability to
develop challenges to popular ideas, formulate unique perspectives, and
develop a strong sense of self.
The third philosophical justification for privacy in personal
information relates, not to an individual’s benefit, but to the benefit of
society.174 Through privacy, individuals gain the freedom that allows for
the development and contribution of unique perspectives to public
debate.175 From this perspective, the ultimate beneficiary of privacy
rights is not the individual but society as a whole. In all three theories,
there is a volitional aspect to the object of the privacy right. Privacy is
protecting the product of one’s thoughts and emotions from scrutiny

164 See Newman, supra note 158, at 311 (noting that “the concept of consent is a
common thread, of varying degrees of import, underlying all three [main philosophical
justifications for privacy]”).
165 See id. at 310–11.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 311.
168 Newman, supra note 158, at 311.
169 Id.
170 See id. at 312.
171 Id. at 314.
172 See id.
173 Id. at 315.
174 Newman, supra note 158, at 317.
175 Id.
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and pressure to change. If violated, the objects of privacy may cease to
exist, as one may abandon unpopular ideas, avoid expression of quirky
personality traits, or neglect to pursue curious endeavors.
Moving from an analysis of privacy to an analysis of property, keep
in mind the volitional nature of the objects of privacy rights, and note
the contrast in the nature of the objects of property rights. Broadly
speaking, the concept of property encompasses all that an individual
possesses.176 From this standpoint, an individual’s real property,
chattel, intangible products of the mind, privileges, and
rights—including the right to privacy—are all objects of property.177 If
the objects being protected have a volitional nature, the shift from the
broad category of property into the subset of privacy is justified. The
protections given by a privacy right protect this volitional nature by
preventing unwanted exposure and freedom from observation.
Property rights generally apply to static objects, both tangible and
intangible, with an exception for the subset of objects of privacy. 178
Under the Fourth Amendment, the question is whether personal data is
properly protected by privacy rights (and, therefore, can only be
brought under the Fourth Amendment through the use of the Katz test),
or whether personal data properly belongs among the more general
objects of property rights entitled to direct, categorical protection from
unreasonable search and seizure.
A “property right” is essentially “the right to exclude.”179
Pragmatically, there is a difference between the function of property
rights and privacy rights. Privacy functions to avoid unwanted exposure
or observation.180 Property functions to prevent unwanted possession,
use, and interference with its objects.181 Examining emerging trends in
data privacy law reveals the fact that personal data is not merely being
shielded from exposure or observation; rather, it is being protected
from unwanted possession, use, and interference. While state
legislatures have not gone so far as to declare a property right in
personal data, likely due to the practical difficulties that may arise with

176

See Brandeis & Warren, supra note 159, at 193.
Id.
178 See id. (stating that the original objects of a property interest were “lands” and
“cattle” but noting that the concept property has grown to encompass intangible objects
as well).
179 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783 (2007).
180 Newman, supra note 158, at 311–14.
181 Brady, supra note 79, at 994.
177
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doing so,182 the Court need not overlook what is actually happening.
Personal data is being treated as property under state data privacy laws.
Perhaps the reason that state legislatures have not classified
personal data as property stems from the difficulty of reconciling
personal data with preexisting notions of property. The doctrine of first
possession awards property rights to one who first provides “notice to
the world through a clear act.”183 Inherent in this theory is a reward for
useful labor.184 Take, for example, the classic case of Pierson v. Post.185
In Pierson, the court awarded property rights to an interloper who shot
a fox as it was being pursued by another hunter.186 The majority found
that the property right belonged to the individual who executed a clear
act evidencing “an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to
his individual use.”187 The court rewarded the labor that went into
hunting the fox by holding that the act created a property right.
Scholars argue that personal data should belong to the person to
whom it relates.188 Indeed, this is the effect given by state data privacy
laws.189 But the person whom personal data relates to often exercises
little or no labor in creating the data. Biometric identifiers are
immutable physical traits that individuals carry throughout life (retinal
patterns, fingerprints, face geometry, etc.). Some personal identifiers
are assigned to individuals at birth (first name, last name, and social
security number). Other forms of personal data are created through
copious amounts of labor on the part of companies recording the data,
and only incidentally by the actions of individuals to whom the data
relates (internet browsing history, search history, CSLI, etc.).
Granting property status to personal data is at odds with the laborbased notion of property. Nonetheless, legislatures are beginning to
treat personal data as if it were property that belonged to the individual
to whom it relates. The Court may take notice of this fact and hold that
personal data is also property under the Fourth Amendment. The
following Section explores the ways that state data privacy laws treat
personal data as property.

182
183
184
185
186
187
188

n.210.
189

Infra Part VI.
Rose, supra note 156, at 77.
Id.
3 Cai. R. 175 (1805).
Id. at 178.
Id.
Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 229–30; see also Elvy, supra note 17, at 463
See infra Section IV.B.

MASCIANDARO (DO NOT DELETE)

1264

4/8/2021 3:59 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1241

B. Property Protections for Personal Data Under State Data Privacy
Laws
1. Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2002
As technology advances, the amount and nature of personal data
available continue to increase. The Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act of 2008190 (BIPA) was the first state legislation to grant
heightened protection to a new class of highly sensitive personal
data—biometric identifiers. Today six states (Illinois, Texas, New York,
Arkansas, California, and Washington) have a law protecting biometric
information.191 BIPA is significant because it treats biometric identifiers
like property by providing for a cause of action on a statutory violation
alone; there is no need to establish a separate injury for the law to
recognize that rights have been violated.192 Recall that Entick,193 the
reputed ultimate expression of the law on search and seizure at the time
drafters wrote the Fourth Amendment,194 provides that “the property of
every man [is] so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his
neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though
he does no damage at all.”195 This special protection afforded to
property differs from the general requirement for a concrete injury in
fact.196 BIPA stands as the first prominent example of affording an
implicit property right in personal data.

190

Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008).
The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What Companies Need to Know in 2020, THE
NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/anatomybiometric-laws-what-us-companies-need-to-know-2020.
192 Rosengrant v. Six Flags, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019) (“[A]n individual need
not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights
under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek
liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”).
193 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
194 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)).
195 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817.
196 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (finding the plaintiff failed to
allege a concrete injury under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, when the
defendant published inaccurate data about him in its credit reporting service).
191
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2. The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
Traditionally, the U.S. approach to data privacy has focused on
regulating the actions of entities that collect data rather than providing
individuals with control over the use of their data.197 The California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018198 (CCPA) disrupted this trend, and a
number of states are ramping up to follow suit.199 The CCPA set a
revolutionary precedent for United States privacy laws. California has a
history of influencing other state legislatures to enact progressive laws
as citizens’ needs change in response to modern innovations.200 Other
states have already begun drafting comprehensive personal data
privacy laws modeled after the CCPA.201
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
influenced the CCPA’s protections.202 Both the GDPR and the CCPA
provide personal data with protections traditionally afforded to
property, rather than the simple protections from unwanted access or
observation germane to privacy rights. The GDPR provides citizens of
the European Union with protection from “unwanted possession”—”the
right to be forgotten”203 by deletion of personal data on request;
“unwanted use”—”the right to object”204 to unwanted data processing;
and “unwanted interference”—”the right to rectification”205 if personal
data is inaccurate or incomplete.206 The CCPA extends two of these
three traditional property rights to personal data: “unwanted
possession” through the right to deletion;207 and “unwanted use” by the
right to object208 to third-party data processing.209 These provisions
197

Newman, supra note 158, at 319.
CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020).
199 See Catherine Barrett, Are the EU GDPR and the California CCPA Becoming the De
Facto Global Standards for Data Privacy and Protection?, 15 SCITECH LAWYER 24, 27
(Spring 2019) (observing that the CCPA elevates protection in personal data privacy to
a fundamental right); see also Green, supra note 17.
200 See Barrett, supra note 199, at 27 (“California laws often serve as a model for other
state legislatures.”).
201 See Green, supra note 17.
202 Sarah Hospelhorn, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) vs. GDPR, VARONIS (June
17, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/ccpa-vs-gdpr.
203 Directive 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (119) 1,13. [hereinafter “GDPR”].
204 Id. art. 21.
205 Id. art. 16.
206 Barrett, supra note 199, at 27.
207 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.105 (West 2020).
208 Id. § 1798.120.
209 Barrett, supra note 199, at 27.
198
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vest individuals not with privacy rights but with ownership rights in
their personal data.210
3. Comprehensive State Personal Data Privacy Legislation
Outside of California
Like the CCPA, other states are moving to enact data privacy laws
that give individuals increased control over their personal data.211 The
right to delete is included in pending bills in New York, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and Hawaii.212 This right goes to the core concept of
property—excluding others from unwanted possession.213 Contrast
this with privacy’s protection from unwanted access to prevent
undesired criticism, humiliation, or pressure to change. These state
laws do not merely require businesses to cease processing personal
data, which would be sufficient to protect privacy rights; they require
deletion—completely relinquishing possession.
Some states’ proposed bills go even further than the CCPA in terms
of granting their citizens implicit property rights in personal data.
Similar to BIPA, Massachusetts’s proposed bill includes a private right
of action for any violation of the law, irrespective of whether an
individual suffered any actual “loss of money or property as a result of
the violation.”214 In New York’s proposed bill, any violation at all
constitutes grounds for a private right of action.215 New York also vests
citizens with a right to correct information held about them.216 This is a
“right to rectification”—the property protection allowing individuals to
be free from unwanted interference that is found in the GDPR.217
Additionally, New York creates a “data fiduciary” role imposing upon
businesses a duty to “exercise the duty of care, loyalty and
confidentiality expected of a fiduciary with respect to securing the
personal data of a consumer against a privacy risk; and . . . act in the best
interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the entity,
controller or data broker.”218 New York’s proposed law goes on to
provide a broad right to opt-out of personal data processing, in contrast
to the right to opt-out of personal information sales found in the

210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Hospelhorn, supra note 202.
See Green, supra note 17.
Id.
Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179.
Green, supra note 17.
Id.
Id.
GDPR, supra note 203, art. 16.
Green, supra note 17.
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CCPA.219 Maryland’s law surpasses the CCPA’s protections by requiring
disclosure of all personal data shared with third parties, even if
provided for free.220
Presently, state laws governing the treatment of personal data are
undergoing a metamorphosis. Our nation is at a point where an implicit
treatment of personal data as property is emerging. The origin of this
change is visible in BIPA, where an individual can sustain a cause of
action without showing injury in fact. The CCPA and copycat statutes on
the horizon take the property-like treatment of personal data to the next
level by granting protections against unwanted possession, use, and
interference. The Court could use these state laws as a basis for
recognizing personal data as personal property—an “effect”—under the
Fourth Amendment. This could allow for smooth and consistent
protection for personal data from warrantless search and seizure.
C. State Data Privacy Laws Apply to Objects Suited for Property
Rights
To decide whether property rights or privacy rights are best suited
to protect a given object, a relevant consideration is whether the object
of the right is the product of one’s volition, such that one would benefit
from preventing unwilling exposure or observation.221 As explained
above, state data privacy laws purport to provide privacy rights, but in
effect, afford protections given to property.222 The case for finding that
personal data is property is strengthened by recognizing that the objects
of these data privacy laws are better classified as property.
BIPA covers “biometric identifiers.”223 The definition of “biometric
identifiers” includes “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan
of hand or face geometry.”224 “Biometric information” includes “any
information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or
shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an
individual.”225 Each of these items is static, hence the usefulness of
biometric identifiers in identifying an individual. The concerns for
protecting these objects do not stem from a desire to avoid exposure or
observation for fear of humiliation or undue social pressure to change;
219 U.S. State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY
PROFESSIONALS: PRIVACY TRACKER (Apr. 18, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/us-statecomprehensive-privacy-law-comparison/.
220 Green, supra note 17.
221 See supra Section IV.A.
222 See supra Section IV.B.
223 Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008).
224 Id. § 10.
225 Id.
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rather, the concerns for protecting this information stem from the
desire to control possession, use, and interference with this highly
sensitive personal data.226 If a nefarious party were to possess another
individual’s biometric identifiers wrongfully, that individual could be
subjected to tampering with financial records, security screenings, and
identity theft.227 BIPA is one example illustrating the fact that classifying
personal data as an object of privacy rather than property is a legal
fiction.
The CCPA also includes objects more readily described as objects
of property rights than of privacy rights. Under the CCPA, “personal
information” is “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is
reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or
household.”228 The statute includes a list of examples, including a real
name, postal address, records of personal property, biometric
information, internet browsing history, search history, and geolocation
data.229 The protections extend beyond objects sure to identify an
individual to “probabilistic identifiers” defined as “the identification of
a consumer or a device to a degree of certainty of more probable than
not based on any categories of personal information included in, or
similar to, the categories enumerated in the definition of personal
information.”230 The CCPA excludes publicly available information.231
The CCPA includes an expansive definition of personal information.
Many of the CCPA’s objects have little or nothing to do with an
individual’s thoughts or emotions—biometric identifiers, postal
address, real name, and records of personal property. The stated
purpose and intent of the CCPA is to “further Californians’ right to
privacy by giving consumers an effective way to control their personal
information.”232 But individuals are being given control over these
objects for the purpose of controlling their use and possession.233
Granted, some of the objects that fall under the CCPA’s expansive
definition of privacy may rightly be thought of as objects best suited for
privacy protections (internet search and browsing histories, for
226 Id. § 5(g) (“The public welfare, security, and safety will be served by regulating
the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of
biometric identifiers and information.”).
227 Id. § 5.
228 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020).
229 Id. § 1798.140(o)(1).
230 Id. § 1798.140(p).
231 Id. § 1798.140(o)(2).
232 2017 Cal. AB 375 § 2(i) (June 28, 2018).
233 See supra Section IV.B.
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example). The fact that there are mixed objects and mixed motives
under the CCPA does not detract from the fact that an implicit grant of
property status is given to personal information. The protections
afforded to all objects of the CCPA are those generally afforded to
property.
Tellingly, even the CCPA’s exclusion of publicly available
information is consistent with an understanding that personal
information is treated as property for Fourth Amendment purposes. In
Oliver v. United States,234 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect “open fields” from warrantless searches by law
enforcement.235 Publicly available information is analogous to an open
field in that an individual does not share the same intimate connection
with publicly available information as with information known only by
oneself and an intentionally selected group of others. Further, open
fields are not “effects,” as an “effect” is an item of personal, not real
property.236
Excluding publicly available information from
classification as an effect is consistent with this premise.
Legislatures have been cautious in extending property rights to
personal data. They are doing so by developing the legal fiction that
stretches privacy rights to afford protections never before given by
privacy law to objects never before subject to privacy law. While these
laws will serve to give individuals heightened protection, more is
needed to ensure individuals’ personal data is secured from abuse. The
states may be best advised to continue using the legal fiction of
expanding the concept of privacy, as explained in Part VI below;
however, the Court could recognize personal data as property to afford
Fourth Amendment protection to personal information in order to allow
for the efficient administration of justice, to provide clear notice to law
enforcement as to warrant requirements and ensure individuals’
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
V. PROMOTING EFFICIENCY IN APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
“The face of the law may be saved by an elaborate ritual, but men,
and not rules, will administer justice.”237 The Court stretched the text of
the Fourth Amendment to create the reasonable expectation of privacy
test to administer justice when it had no other way to do so. While this
device may remain useful, perhaps even necessary in certain contexts,
the time has arrived when the reasonable expectation of privacy test
234
235
236
237

466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Id. at 178–84.
Brady, supra note 79, at 1001.
Pound, supra note 1, at 20.
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may no longer be needed to protect personal data from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Recognizing property rights in personal data
would allow the Fourth Amendment to directly protect personal data
from unreasonable search and seizure as an “effect.”
Pound noted the problem with legal fictions long ago: “until the law
has evolved some device by which [individuals] may use it in all cases
the weak and friendless and lowly will be at a practical disadvantage,
despite the legal theory.”238 As Pound observed, changes in law present
risks.239 This fact results in legislatures hesitating before implementing
needed changes in the law.240 Further, political tensions can hinder the
legislative process, making it difficult for controversial new laws to pass.
It may not be for many years, if ever, that the legislature outright
declares personal data as property. This leaves the most vulnerable
members of society at the greatest risk of failing to receive protection
for their personal data under the Fourth Amendment.
Fortunately for individuals, the United States Supreme Court is
now primed to grant protection to personal data by recognizing
personal data as property belonging to the individual that it relates to.
“Fourth Amendment law is constructed by the ‘concepts’ and
‘understandings’ that derive from social life and myriad state laws
. . . .”241 Following along this natural course, the Court may first
recognize that a property right in personal data exists implicitly under
state legislation, and then hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to
personal data as an effect.
It seems that the Court has been awaiting a moment to decide
whether or not property rights exist in data for some time now. Justice
Scalia stated that whether or not computer data is an “effect” is “a really
good question.”242 Justice Scalia refrained from answering a student
from Brooklyn Law School who asked whether computer data is an
effect, noting that “[t]hat’s something that may well come up.”243 Justice
Gorsuch discussed the viability of an appeal to positive law in Carpenter
for protecting CSLI under the Fourth Amendment but noted that
Carpenter had waived that right by failing to assert it in courts below.244
238

Id. at 17.
Id. at 12.
240 See id. at 14.
241 Brady, supra note 79, at 1002.
242 Debra Cassens Weiss, Does the Fourth Amendment Protect Computer Data? Scalia
Says It’s a Really Good Question, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 24, 2014, 1:06 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/asked_about_nsa_stuff_scalia_says_convers
ations_arent_protected_by_fourth_a.
243 Id.
244 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 219.
239
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The time may have arrived where, given the right case or controversy,
the Court will hold that personal data is a form of property.
A. Defining Personal Data
Personal data will need to be precisely defined to comport with due
process requirements for fair notice and to avoid arbitrary enforcement
of the law. Advancements in technology demand adjustments in law to
maintain the proper balance between liberty and security.245 Lower
courts need guidance from the Supreme Court to handle challenges
presented by modern technology, and law enforcement needs guidance
to prevent overly permeating police surveillance.246 Carpenter dealt
with historic CSLI, but this is not the only form of personal data that
ought to be brought under the Fourth Amendment. In crafting a
definition for personal data under the Fourth Amendment, the Court
should look to state data privacy laws for guidance,247 ensure that new
forms of sensitive data that are likely to develop will be covered, and
provide an intelligible definition that benefits both courts and citizens.
Under this analysis, the most appropriate definition for personal
data may be limited to those objects that exist independently of a
person’s volition. Biometric identifiers and biometric information
should certainly fall under this definition, for not only do they exist
independent of an individual’s will, but they are also largely
unchangeable. Other candidates to include are items that bear little
relation to intimate thoughts or emotions. For example, a person’s real
name, street address, IP address, date of birth, and social security
number are best understood as objects of property since the risk of
abuse lies not in unwanted exposure or observation but in unwanted
possession, use, or interference.
Alternatively, a broadly defined concept of personal information
could alleviate the struggle found in more Fourth Amendment cases that
invoke Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Katz’s
conversation, for example, could be considered personal information
under the CCPA once recorded because it is capable of identifying
Katz.248 The third-party doctrine may also decrease in utility if the
definition of personal data were to follow the path of the CCPA by
245

See generally Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24 (describing the interplay that new
technologies create by providing new tools for both criminals and law enforcement
agents).
246 See id. at 206.
247 Brady, supra note 79, at 1002 (“Fourth Amendment law is constructed by the
‘concepts’ and ‘understandings’ that derive from social life and myriad state laws.”).
248 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020).
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excluding publicly available information from the definition of personal
data.249 One difficulty with taking up the broadly expansive definition
of personal data used under the CCPA is that it fails to provide clear
notice as to what exactly personal data is. The notion of “probabilistic
identifiers” is particularly vague, employing a standard of being “more
probable than not” that information identifies a consumer or device.250
If the goal is a categorical rule providing clear notice to individuals and
law enforcement, a narrower definition of personal data may be best.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF DECLARING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PERSONAL DATA
Holding that personal data is an effect under the Fourth
Amendment would have substantial implications. While individuals
would presumably enjoy constitutional protection over their data, the
pervasive and varied nature of data can create confusion, rather than
provide clarity, when applying a warrant requirement. This Part
explores challenges that may arise if personal data were recognized as
an effect.
A. Implications of Treating Data as Property Under the Fourth
Amendment
Recognizing personal data as property is likely to be met with its
fair share of backlash. The government may argue an impediment in
prosecuting criminals, scholars may object on philosophical grounds,
and businesses may fight vehemently on the grounds of an undue
burden.251 Such a reaction should come as no surprise—it is known that
changes in the law are dangerous.252 The likelihood of this backlash
ought not to prevent the Court from recognizing that personal data is
property for two reasons: (1) personal data is rightly understood as an
effect, and (2) all of these criticisms can be quieted.
First, consider those who argue that declaring a property right in
personal data would impede law enforcement in prosecuting criminals.
Law enforcement is not left without access to personal data under this
approach. Rather, law enforcement officers must simply comply with
the Fourth Amendment requirement to ensure a search is reasonable.
By demonstrating probable cause and acquiring a warrant, law
enforcement can search and seize personal data.

249
250
251
252

Id. § 1798.140(o)(2).
Id. § 1798.140(p).
This objection is discussed in Section VI.B.
Pound, supra note 1, at 12.
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Next, consider the philosophical objections that scholars are bound
to launch. As discussed in Part III above, the mistaken belief that data is
intangible will likely be hurled critically at the Court. But this
conception lacks the scientific understanding that information is
tangible once recorded.253 An online course in data science may silence
the objections of critics arguing on the grounds of the intangible nature
of data. Though accepting the tangible nature of personal data would be
useful in understanding that personal data is property, it is not
necessary. Property includes not only tangible possessions but
intangible possessions as well.254
A second philosophical objection may be raised because more than
one person can possess data at the same time. But, as noted above,
complete ownership and exclusive control are not necessarily required
for Fourth Amendment protection under a property-based approach.255
Justice Gorsuch raised this point in his dissenting opinion in
Carpenter.256 When an individual rents a home, rather than owning it in
fee simple, the Fourth Amendment still protects that home from
unreasonable search and seizure.257 Further, multiple individuals may
share ownership in a home, and each is entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.
A third philosophical objection is likely to be that even if personal
data is property, it should belong to the person or entity that creates the
data, rather than the individual to whom the information pertains.
While this argument has the support of the historic labor-based theories
of property, personal data is unique to modern times. It is unclear if
property would have been so defined if expansive digitized records
relating to individuals’ identities were available long ago. Germany’s
Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure has recognized
this fact in proposing a law that makes data legally equivalent to other
commodities.258 Among the principles that this law relies on are notions
that “data should belong to the person to which the data pertains,”
“public data is to be considered as open data,” and individuals should be
able to make informed decisions regarding the use of their data.259 The
253 See Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 223 (“the scientific consensus [is] that digital
information is not intangible, but is physical, tangible matter”); see also id. at 256 (“[T]he
physical quality of information, and the idea that information is a physical constituent
of the universe, are widely adopted within the scientific community.”).
254 Brandeis & Warren, supra note 159, at 193.
255 See United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269 (2018).
256 Id.
257 Id. at 2269–70.
258 Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 229–30.
259 Id.
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United States would be wise to adopt this principle, as it best protects
the intimate relationship between an individual and his or her personal
data.
B. Consequences of Treating Data as Property Against Private
Actors
As to the business organizations that are likely to kick and scream
if property status works its way into the civil law against private actors,
arguing that compliance is not feasible, the most straightforward
response is that it is not that hard to delete data. By deleting
information, a business ensures it is not infringing on property rights
that exclude unwanted possession, use, or interference. While it is true
that there may be a period that businesses need to expend significant
funds in order to become compliant with new laws regulating data as
property, this is no reason to abandon the protection that justice
requires for personal data.
If personal data were treated as property under a civil statute
against private actors, individuals claiming an injury of their rights
would be likely to proceed for injunctive relief.260 Generally, a violation
of property rights is remediated by injunction, where a violation of a
privacy right is remediated by money damages.261 This may pose a
difficulty, as an injunction must be capable of precise definition in order
to be effective.262 Consider the expansive definition of personal
information present in the CCPA.263 How far would an injunction need
to reach in the case of probabilistic identifiers? Would all data that led
to identification of the individual need to be included in the injunction?
Would it suffice to eliminate just enough information to decrease the
probability of identifying the individual? If so, what information should
be deleted? Who gets to decide? This trouble with applying injunctive
relief presents itself in patent litigation.264 The difficulty in limiting the
scope of the injunction to the asserted property interest leads to
situations that “systematically overcompensate plaintiffs and overdeter
defendants, with significant negative consequences for innovation and
economic growth.”265

260

Id. at 249 (quoting Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179, at 786) (“[A] property rule
provides for an injunction and a liability rule provides for nonconsensual access in
return for a payment of money damages.”).
261 Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179, at 786.
262 Id. at 794.
263 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020).
264 Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179, at 784–85.
265 Id. at 785.
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Perhaps there is a way around this, but perhaps this difficulty is
unavoidable. Though the Court likely ought to forge ahead and declare
that personal data is property subject to Fourth Amendment protection,
states may best be left to experiment behind the veil of their legal fiction.
By persisting in regulating under privacy law while granting piecemeal
property rights to individuals in their personal data, courts will not have
to face the difficulties that arise in attempts to fashion appropriate
injunctive relief.
C. Personal Data During a Pandemic
In late 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic struck the globe and quickly
became known as “an unprecedented situation” as a host of novel issues
arose.266 The rapid spread of the coronavirus presented a challenge to
concerns over personal data protections. Technology could give
governments the ability to stop the spread of COVID-19 by tapping into
personal data revealing whom individuals come into contact with or
monitoring adherence to stay-at-home orders. But depending on the
technology adopted, individuals’ rights could be compromised.
Several governments around the world implemented contact
tracing technology to contain the pandemic.267 Some technologies
employ Bluetooth to detect individuals’ proximity to each other,
providing information on when someone contacted a person carrying
the coronavirus.268 These technologies fall on the less invasive end of
the spectrum because they do not actually reveal an individual’s
location. Other technologies rely on GPS tracking269—creating the
possibility of government access to the location data Supreme Court
Justices have recognized could compromise individuals’ reasonable
expectations of privacy.270

266 See, e.g., Bibiana Campos Seijo, An Unprecedented Situation, C&EN, Vol. 98, Issue
11 (Mar. 21, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/biological-chemistry/infectious-disease/
unprecedented-situation/98/i11; Tyler Thrasher, Amid Protests and COVID-19, GRTC
‘Operating in an Unprecedented Situation,’ ABC 8 NEWS (updated June 3, 2020, 5:21 pm),
https://www.wric.com/news/local-news/richmond/amid-protests-and-covid-19grtc-operating-in-an-unprecedented-situation.
267 Luke Dembosky, et al., Can Contact Tracing Apps Help Get Many of Us Back to Work
Soon? A Framework for Evaluating the Various Options and Legal Concerns, DEBEVOISE IN
DEPTH: CORONAVIRUS RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.debevoise.com/
insights/publications/2020/04/can-contact-tracing-apps-help (“China, Hong Kong,
Israel, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have all had varying degrees of success in
using electronic contact tracing . . . to allow a significant portion of their population to
return to school and work, albeit with limitations.”).
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 216–17 (long-term GPS monitoring).
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Concerns amplify if the technology allows for real-time collection
of data. This would create the equivalent of wiretapping a conversation
in the context of ongoing, immediate access to citizens’ locations. For
law enforcement to acquire information through a wiretap, officers
must make a greater showing than needed for a typical
warrant—demonstrating the sensitive nature of intercepting real-time
information.271 Real-time access to individuals’ locations would be
alarmingly invasive.
If personal data were recognized as property, any governmentimposed location tracking would run head-on into Fourth Amendment
protections. Despite the grave nature of the pandemic, the United States
government did not impose mandatory tracking via GPS technologies.
Institutions, such as college universities, by and large, opted for less
invasive contact tracing devices, such as those relying on self-reporting
of symptoms and Bluetooth technology. Those that did choose to
mandate the use of a contact tracing app with GPS monitoring
capabilities were met with backlash.272 Could this be evidence that
personal data is already property in the minds of American citizens?
Certainly, it lends support to that conclusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Personal data is gaining momentum on a path toward personal
property status. Legislatures are treating personal data as personal
property. Individuals are demanding and receiving control of their data
as if it were their property. The day may not be far off when the Court
recognizes personal data as personal property—an “effect” falling
squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s protections. While useful, the
legal fictions that create difficulties in administrating the law and risk
leaving the vulnerable without protection would no longer be
necessary. The Court could recognize that personal data is implicitly
treated as personal property under state legislation and hold that
personal data is an effect under the Fourth Amendment. Doing so would
harmonize the original intent to protect effects under the Fourth
271

See Professor David W. Opderbeck, Cybersurveillance Developments, THE
CYBERSECURITY LAWYER (June 10, 2016), https://thecybersecuritylawyer.com/2016/06/
10/cybersurveillance-developments (“For communications in transit, the Wiretap Act
requires a showing of probable cause plus a showing that ‘normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.’ 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).” (emphasis added)).
272 See, e.g., Zack Whittaker, Fearing Coronavirus, A Michigan College is Tracking Its
Students with a Flawed App: And Students Have No Way to Opt Out, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 19,
2020, 4:30 p.m.), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/19/coronavirus-albion-securityflaws-app.
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Amendment with the emergence of a novel form of personal
property—personal data. While remaining useful in other contexts,
legal fictions would no longer be needed to protect personal data from
unreasonable search and seizure.

